India-China LAC face-off: Moscow Consensus helped India as it did in 1965?

By Prof Ashok Tiku, Senior China Affairs Analyst

Only time will show whether the September 10^th joint statement at Moscow that has brought a temporary lull and peace at the LAC is destined to meet the same fate as the one witnessed in 1965.

What seems probable is that India’s timely control of the heights on the Indian side of LAC, taking commanding positions on the top of five features to the south of Pangong Tso from where it can intercept Chinese army movements from Chushul to Demchok through the valleys below, a definite disadvantage for China, has in a way contributed to forcing China to the negotiating table.

Russian president Mr. Putin made a commendable attempt to prevent the escalation of tensions. The Chinese climb down could be as China cannot say no to Russia because of heavy dependence on Moscow for policies and coordination in relations with the US, EU, Indo-pacific, etc. It could also serve as a  face-saver for China because the coming months would witness extreme cold temperatures not conducive for human safety let alone a war.

China also knows that the Indian army is a formidable adversary in these conditions. Perhaps China’s preoccupation with Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea, Australia, the US also contributed to this bilateral consensus. Since till date, no agreement has worked with China and the stern and undiplomatic statements issued by the Chinese official media and PLA, after the meeting, do not encourage one to think otherwise.

Moreover, China’s history of perfidy, double-speaking, the pursuit of Middle kingdom mindset, lack of a formidable leader acceptable to all factions and stakeholders within the CPC capable of taking decisions on the Border issue, all point to a temporary halt and do not augur well for peace and tranquillity on LAC.

Foreign Minister Mr. Jai Shanker has rightly mentioned that ‘unless there is total disengagement of troops, India will not develop bilateral relations’ whereas china wants disengagement and de-escalation and not  ‘April status quo ante’. Apparently the aim is to shift the focus to economic development and economic partnership,  clearly a mismatch between the positions of the two sides.

The joint statement accepts that the differences exist on the issue and a more nuanced diplomatic way has been found to sidetrack the issue for the time being to sustain diplomatic channels. The joint statement refers to “not allowing differences to become disputes” and acknowledges that “the current situation in the border areas is not in the interests of either side”, “border troops should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions”. Evidently even though both sides do recognize the problem and even then the several rounds of corps commander level talks have not produced any convincing results. The current face-off with battle-ready troops facing each other on a razor edge reflects that withdrawing from the held-up positions is not acceptable and is a difficult call. Experience shows that withdrawing from Kailash range heights and retaking them when needed would also be an impossible task for India to safeguard its strategic interests.

Both India and China have their own reasons to sustain dialogue, buy time, and enable each other to have a better assessment of the complex situation that does not seem to provide an easy escape. With China still undecided and facing internal power struggle among the coalitions that constitute the CPC, it is unlikely that a reasonable solution can be found in near future to ease the situation. With increasing distrust of China in India, the downward slide in relations seems to be the only possibility.

The India-China relationship has become adversarial, difficult, and more complicated. Chinese are unlikely to vacate the land and oblige India by withdrawing to April 2020 positions. India too has to be vigilant and not let down the guard. It appears that hard military posturing by PLA, diplomatic dexterity displayed by Mr. Wang Yi is only aimed at buying time. The Chinese Ambassador in Delhi Mr. Sun Weidong maintains that the road map shown in the joint statement is an important step towards the right direction, and will provide political impetus to ease the border situation and promote the bilateral relations. The way forward as pointed out by him is the “agreement “reached by the two foreign ministers leading to easing the situation and subsequently work on the new confidence-building measures to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

Indian defense Minister Mr. Rajnath Singh has categorically and in an unambiguous way told both houses of Parliament that “China’s double talk has been exposed’, “China does not honour old agreements and historical facts”.” China is responsible for the current crisis and tried to alter the status quo at LAC and provoked Indian forces“, India will not allow a change in the status-quo”, “India will respond to any aggression on LAC and will never let China have what they want”. India will match China’s buildup at LAC. “This has been conveyed to Chinese leadership both at military and political levels”.

India has to assume that it will be at the receiving end of China-Pak joint aggression – overtly and covertly and has to be prepared for any eventuality. The big noise China is making is for a direct link road to POK via  Karakoram pass to save about 1500 km of the supply route currently operating via Khunzraba pass. Beijing’s diplomatic and political gestures, overtones to resolve the issue are not matched by PLA’s action on the ground.

There is a total disconnect between PLA’s actions and political-diplomatic engagements. PLA is imparting military training to the villagers in the border areas, building infrastructure, laying optical fiber cables at a breakneck speed south of Pangong Tso to boost communications. All pointing to buying time and waiting for an opportune moment to strike. PLA will have to showcase tangible results before the CPC’s plenum meeting slated to be held in the middle of October.  In such a scenario where is the need for another new agreement on confidence-building measures when several of these signed in the past have not worked?  India would be advised not to enter into any new agreements on peace and tranquillity. The present consensus arrived at Moscow is likely to meet the same fate as 1965 with Pak which worked to the disadvantage of India. India has to remain vigilant and be prepared for all eventualities.

About the author:

Prof. Ashok Tiku, Former HOD, Amity School of Languages, Amity University Gurgaon is an authority on Chinese affairs with over 45 years of experience as an analyst. Born in Srinagar, Prof. Tiku did his Masters from Peking University, Beijing, and lived in China for 10 years.